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Self-Reported Signaling

By Thomas Jungbauer and Michael Waldman

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, August 2023

In many real-world settings, an action that affects the value of a product or service is self-reported rather than publicly observable. We investigate self-reporting when self-reports serve as a signal of sender productivity. In our model, a sender choose...

Disclosure in Markets for Ratings

By Ran Weksler and Boaz Zik

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, August 2023

We study the implications of the disclosure regime of ratings on the level of information released to the public. Specifically, we compare mandatory and voluntary disclosure. We analyze a model where the potential issuers are initially endowed with homoge...

Working for References

By Samuel Häfner and Curtis R. Taylor

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, August 2023

We analyze the incentive and welfare consequences of job references in a large economy marked by moral hazard, limited liability, exogenous job separation, and structural unemployment. In the firm-optimal equilibrium, employers provide references whenever...

Decreasing Impatience

By Christopher P. Chambers, Federico Echenique, and Alan D. Miller

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, August 2023

We characterize decreasing impatience, a common behavioral phenomenon in intertemporal choice. Discount factors that display decreasing impatience are characterized through a convexity axiom for investments at fixed interest rates. Then we show that they ...

Influence Campaigns

By Evan Sadler

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, August 2023

Firms and politicians, among others, invest heavily to influence people's opinions. Because peers influence one another, these efforts must account for social networks. Using a model of opinion dynamics with a non-degenerate steady state, I develop a new ...

Judicial Mechanism Design

By Ron Siegel and Bruno Strulovici

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, August 2023

This paper proposes a mechanism-design approach to study criminal justice systems. We derive properties of optimal mechanisms for two notions of welfare distinguished by their treatment of deterrence. These properties provide insights into the effects of ...

Bid Caps in Noisy Contests

By Qiang Fu, Zenan Wu, and Yuxuan Zhu

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, August 2023

This paper studies optimal bid caps in a multiplayer noisy contest in which a higher bid does not guarantee a sure win. The bid cap can be either rigid or flexible. The former imposes outright bidding restrictions on players' bids, while the latter taxes ...