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Corrupted Votes and Rule Compliance

By Arno Apffelstaedt Jana Freundt

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2024

Allegations of voter fraud accompany many real-world elections. How does electoral malpractice affect the acceptance of elected institutions? Using an online experiment in which participants distribute income according to majority-elected rules, we show t...

Consistent Depth of Reasoning in Level-k Models

By David J. Cooper, Enrique Fatas, Antonio J. Morales, and Shi Qi

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2024

Level-k models often assume that individuals employ a fixed depth of reasoning across different games. We study this assumption by having subjects make choices in five classes of games chosen to identify inconsistent depth of reasoning. We demonstr...

The Status Quo and Belief Polarization of Inattentive Agents: Theory and Experiment

By Vladimír Novák, Andrei Matveenko, and Silvio Ravaioli

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2024

We show that rational but inattentive agents can become polarized ex ante. We present how optimal information acquisition and subsequent belief formation depend crucially on the agent-specific status quo valuation. Beliefs can systematically—in expectat...

Fair Shares and Selective Attention

By Dianna R. Amasino, Davide D. Pace, and Joël J. van der Weele

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2024

Attitudes toward fairness and redistribution differ along socioeconomic lines. To understand their formation, we conduct a large-scale experiment on attention to merit and luck and the effect of attention on fairness decisions. Randomly advantaged subject...

Bargaining in the Shadow of Uncertainty

By Marina Agranov, Hülya Eraslan, and Chloe Tergiman

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2024

In bargaining environments with stochastic future surplus, failing to delay agreement can be inefficient when the expected future surplus is sufficiently high. Theoretically, such inefficiencies never arise under unanimity rule but can arise under majorit...