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Eliciting Time Preferences When Income and Consumption Vary: Theory, Validation, and Application to Job Search

By Michèle Belot, Philipp Kircher, and Paul Muller

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, February 2025

We propose a simple method for eliciting individual time preferences without estimating utility functions even in settings where background consumption changes over time. It relies on eliciting preferences for receiving high stakes lottery tickets at diff...

Triplet Embeddings for Demand Estimation

By Lorenzo Magnolfi, Jonathon McClure, and Alan Sorensen

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, February 2025

We propose a method to augment conventional demand estimation approaches with crowd-sourced data on the product space. Our method obtains triplets data ("product A is closer to B than it is to C") from an online survey to compute an embedding—i.e., a lo...

Eliciting Ambiguity with Mixing Bets

By Patrick Schmidt

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, February 2025

Preferences for mixing can reveal ambiguity perception and attitude on a single event. The validity of the approach is discussed for multiple preference classes, including maxmin, maxmax, variational, and smooth second-order preferences. An experimental i...

One Man, One Vote

By Romans Pancs and Tridib Sharma

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, February 2025

In the United States, electoral districts must be equipopulous. This requirement is known as the one man, one vote doctrine. We propose welfare-based justifications for this requirement under the economic view, according to which voters care about the pol...

A Random Dictator Is All You Need

By Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, and Konstantin Zabarnyi

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, February 2025

We study information aggregation with a decision-maker aggregating binary recommendations from symmetric agents. Each agent's recommendation depends on her private information about a hidden state. While the decision-maker knows the prior distribution ove...

Scoring Strategic Agents

By Ian Ball

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, February 2025

I introduce a model of predictive scoring. A receiver wants to predict a sender's quality. An intermediary observes multiple features of the sender and aggregates them into a score. Based on the score, the receiver makes a decision. The sender prefers "hi...