What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice
- (pp. 669-89)
AbstractIn several school choice districts in the United States, the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm is applied after indifferences in priority orders are broken in some exogenous way. Although such a tie-breaking procedure preserves stability, it adversely affects the welfare of the students since it introduces artificial stability constraints. Our main finding is a polynomial-time algorithm for the computation of a student-optimal stable matching when priorities are weak. The idea behind our construction relies on a new notion which we call a stable improvement cycle. We also investigate the strategic properties of the student-optimal stable mechanism.
Citation2008. "What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice." American Economic Review, 98 (3): 669-89. DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.3.669
- I28 Education: Government Policy
- H75 State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
- I21 Analysis of Education