This website uses cookies.

By clicking the "Accept" button or continuing to browse our site, you agree to first-party and session-only cookies being stored on your device to enhance site navigation and analyze site performance and traffic. For more information on our use of cookies, please see our Privacy Policy.

  1. Home
  2. Journals
  3. American Economic Review
  4. March 2001
  5. The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives

The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives

Download Full Text PDF

Abstract

Politicians who care about the spoils of office may underprovide a public good because its benefits cannot be targeted to voters as easily as pork-barrel spending. We compare a winner-take-all system--where all the spoils go to the winner--to a proportional system--where the spoils of office are split among candidates proportionally to their share of the vote. In a winner-take-all system the public good is provided less often than in a proportional system when the public good is particularly desirable. We then consider the electoral college system and show that it is particularly subject to this inefficiency.

Citation

Lizzeri, Alessandro, and Nicola Persico. 2001. "The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives." American Economic Review, 91 (1): 225-239. DOI: 10.1257/aer.91.1.225

JEL Classification

  • D72 Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
  • H41 Public Goods