A Signal to End Child Marriage: Theory and Experimental Evidence from Bangladesh
American Economic Review
vol. 113,
no. 10, October 2023
(pp. 2645-88)
Abstract
Child marriage remains common even where female schooling and employment opportunities have grown. We experimentally evaluate a financial incentive to delay marriage alongside a girls' empowerment program in Bangladesh. While girls eligible for two years of incentive are 19 percent less likely to marry underage, the empowerment program failed to decrease adolescent marriage. We show that these results are consistent with a signaling model in which bride type is imperfectly observed but preferred types (socially conservative girls) have lower returns to delaying marriage. Consistent with our theoretical prediction, we observe substantial spillovers of the incentive on untreated nonpreferred types.Citation
Buchmann, Nina, Erica Field, Rachel Glennerster, Shahana Nazneen, and Xiao Yu Wang. 2023. "A Signal to End Child Marriage: Theory and Experimental Evidence from Bangladesh." American Economic Review, 113 (10): 2645-88. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20220720Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C93 Field Experiments
- D91 Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
- J12 Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse
- J13 Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
- J16 Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
- O12 Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development