Dynamic Matching in Overloaded Waiting Lists
AbstractThis paper introduces a stylized model to capture distinctive features of waiting list allocation mechanisms. First, agents choose among items with associated expected wait times. Waiting times serve a similar role to that of monetary prices in directing agents' choices and rationing items. Second, the expected wait for an item is endogenously determined and randomly fluctuates over time. We evaluate welfare under these endogenously determined waiting times and find that waiting time fluctuations lead to misallocation and welfare loss. A simple randomized assignment policy can reduce misallocation and increase welfare.
CitationLeshno, Jacob D. 2022. "Dynamic Matching in Overloaded Waiting Lists." American Economic Review, 112 (12): 3876-3910. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201111
- C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D61 Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness