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  3. American Economic Review
  4. June 2012
  5. Incentives Work: Getting Teachers to Come to School

American Economic Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

Incentives Work: Getting Teachers to Come to School

  • Esther Duflo
  • Rema Hanna
  • Stephen P. Ryan
American Economic Review
vol. 102, no. 4, June 2012
(pp. 1241–78)
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Abstract

We use a randomized experiment and a structural model to test whether monitoring and financial incentives can reduce teacher absence and increase learning in India. In treatment schools, teachers' attendance was monitored daily using cameras, and their salaries were made a nonlinear function of attendance. Teacher absenteeism in the treatment group fell by 21 percentage points relative to the control group, and the children's test scores increased by 0.17 standard deviations. We estimate a structural dynamic labor supply model and find that teachers respond strongly to financial incentives. Our model is used to compute cost-minimizing compensation policies. (JEL I21, J31, J45, O15)

Citation

Duflo, Esther, Rema Hanna, and Stephen P. Ryan. 2012. "Incentives Work: Getting Teachers to Come to School." American Economic Review 102 (4): 1241–78. DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.4.1241

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • I21 Analysis of Education
  • J31 Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
  • J45 Public Sector Labor Markets
  • O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration