American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Similarity of Information and Collective Action
American Economic Review
(pp. 1189–1233)
Abstract
We study a canonical collective action game with incomplete information. Individuals attempt to coordinate to achieve a shared goal, while also facing a temptation to free-ride. More similar information can help them coordinate, but it can also exacerbate free-riding. Our main result shows that more similar information facilitates (impedes) achieving the common goal when it is sufficiently challenging (easy). We apply this insight to show why less powerful authoritarian governments may face larger protests if they restrict press freedom, when committee diversity is beneficial in costly voting, and when a more diverse community contributes more to public good provision.Citation
Basak, Deepal, Joyee Deb, and Aditya Kuvalekar. 2026. "Similarity of Information and Collective Action." American Economic Review 116 (4): 1189–1233. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20241056Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C71 Cooperative Games
- D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D81 Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- H41 Public Goods