American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Games on Multiplex Networks
American Economic Review
(pp. 1415–58)
Abstract
We develop a simple multilayer network model in which agents allocate effort across layers with heterogeneous structures, subject to an aggregate effort constraint. Incentives are shaped by agents' network positions within each layer, and equilibrium behavior reflects both within- and cross-layer interactions. We analyze how shocks propagate through the network and characterize optimal targeting interventions. Our results show that effective policy design must account for effort allocation across layers. We also demonstrate that predictions from monolayer models can diverge sharply from those of multilayer models, underscoring the importance of accounting for network complexity in both empirical and policy analyses.Citation
Zenou, Yves, and Junjie Zhou. 2026. "Games on Multiplex Networks." American Economic Review 116 (4): 1415–58. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20240763Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C70 Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
- D78 Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D85 Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
- H41 Public Goods
- Z13 Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification