Wage Adjustment in Efficient Long-Term Employment Relationships

By Michael W. L. Elsby, Axel Gottfries, Pawel Krolikowski, and Gary Solon

American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics

We present a model in which efficient long-term employment relationships are sustained by wage adjustments prompted by productivity shocks and outside job offers. These wage adjustments occur only sporadically, due to the presence of renegotiation cost...

Symmetric Equilibrium in Pre-Auction Investment

By Daniel Quint and Fuhito Kojima

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

We characterize the symmetric equilibria of a pre-auction game of investment in an internet ad auction environment. For a wide class of auction formats, we show a symmetric equilibrium exists for the pre-auction investment game, is essentially unique, ...

Competing Diffusions in a Social Network

By Arthur Campbell, C. Matthew Leister, Philip Ushchev, and Yves Zenou

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

We develop a model of competing diffusions of goods on a social network. There are two types of goods and individuals: mass-market and niche-market. We find that there is a unique stable steady state and show that the adoption of a massmarket good is g...

Reputation and Competitive Selection

By Joyee Deb and Jack Fanning

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

We demonstrate how selection in competitive markets can impede longrun reputational incentives. In our model, competent firms can exert costly effort to improve expected product quality, but inept firms cannot. With low entry barriers, we show competen...

Strategic Limit Orders and Intertemporal Price Dispersion

By Suman Banerjee, Ravi Jagannathan, and Kai Wang

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

We study a two-period commodity market with competitive consumers and Cournot sellers. Without speculation, equilibrium is stationary. A storage-capable, strategically large speculator can profitably create deterministic intertemporal price dispersion u...

Learning in the Marriage Market: The Economics of Dating

By Yair Antler, Daniel Bird, and Daniel Fershtman

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

This paper develops a search-and-matching model where potential partners can learn about their compatibility as a couple by spending time together (interpreted as dating). We show that a steady-state equilibrium exists and characterize its induced dati...

Bonus Question: How Does Flexible Incentive Pay Affect Unemployment Dynamics?

By Meghana Gaur, John Grigsby, Jonathon Hazell, and Abdoulaye Ndiaye

American Economic Review: Insights

We introduce dynamic incentive contracts into a model of unemployment fluctuations. Our main result is that wage cyclicality from incentives does not affect the response of unemployment to productivity shocks. The response of unemployment is the same, ...

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