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Are Speculators Unwelcome in Multi-object Auctions?

By Marco Pagnozzi

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, May 2010

I consider a uniform-price auction under complete information. The possibility of resale attracts speculators who have no use value for the objects on sale. A high-value bidder may strictly prefer to let a speculator win some of the objects and then buy i...

www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.2.2.97

The Micro-geography of Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Littered Cigarette Packs in Chicago

By David Merriman

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, May 2010

The large tax differentials between Chicago and neighboring jurisdictions provide an incentive for cigarette tax avoidance. Data from a random sample of cigarette packs littered in Chicago reveals a startling degree of tax avoidance: three-quarters did no...

www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.2.2.61

Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games

By Alessandro Pavan and Giacomo Calzolari

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, May 2010

We introduce new revelation mechanisms for simultaneous common agency games which, although they do not always permit a complete equilibrium characterization, do facilitate the characterization of the equilibrium outcomes that are typically of interest in...

www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.2.2.132

Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance with Endogenous Private Insurance

By Raj Chetty and Emmanuel Saez

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, May 2010

We characterize welfare gains from government intervention when the private sector provides partial insurance. We analyze models in which adverse selection, pre-existing information, or imperfect optimization create a role for government intervention. We ...

www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.2.2.85

Public Goods, Social Pressure, and the Choice between Privacy and Publicity

By Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, May 2010

We model privacy as an agent's choice of action being unobservable to others. An agent derives utility from his action, the aggregate of agents' actions, and other agents' perceptions of his type. If his action is unobservable, he takes his full-informati...

www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.2.2.191

Are Tax Incentives for Charitable Giving Efficient? Evidence from France

By Gabrielle Fack and Camille Landais

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, May 2010

This paper estimates the effect of tax incentives for charitable contributions in France. We focus on two reforms that increased the nonrefundable tax credit rate for charitable contributions by 32 percent. We use a difference-in-difference identification...

www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.2.2.117

The Pricing of Academic Journals: A Two-Sided Market Perspective

By Doh-Shin Jeon and Jean-Charles Rochet

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, May 2010

More and more academic journals are adopting an open access policy by which articles are accessible free of charge, while publication costs are recovered through author fees. We study the consequences of this open access policy on the quality standard of ...

www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.2.2.222

The First of the Month Effect: Consumer Behavior and Store Responses

By Justine Hastings and Ebonya Washington

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, May 2010

Previous research has demonstrated that benefit recipients decrease expenditures on, and consumption of, food throughout the benefit month. Using detailed grocery store scanner data, we ask two questions: whether cycling is due to a desire for variety tha...

www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.2.2.142

Child Benefit Support and Method of Payment: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Belgium

By Marieke Huysentruyt and Eva Lefevere

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, May 2010

We examine the effects of information and information presentation format on individuals' choice of payment method in a large randomized experiment carried out with the Belgian National Office for Family Benefits. We find that a one-time mailing providing...

www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.2.2.163

Estimating the Effect of Student Aid on College Enrollment: Evidence from a Government Grant Policy Reform

By Helena Skyt Nielsen, Torben Sørensen, and Christopher Taber

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, May 2010

In this paper, we estimate the response of college enrollment to changes in student aid arising from a Danish reform. We separately identify the effect of aid from that of other observed and unobserved variables such as parental income. We exploit the com...

www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.2.2.185