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Showing 761-777 of 777 items.

Just Enough or All: Selling a Firm

By Mehmet Ekmekci, Nenad Kos, and Rakesh Vohra

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, August 2016

We consider the problem of selling a firm to a single buyer. The buyer privately knows post-sale cash flows and the benefits of control. Unlike the case where buyer's private information is one-dimensional, the optimal mechanism is a menu of tuples of cas...

Delegating Multiple Decisions

By Alex Frankel

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2016

This paper shows how to extend the heuristic of capping an agent against her bias to delegation problems over multiple decisions. Caps may be exactly optimal when the agent has constant biases, in which case a cap corresponds to a ceiling on the weighted ...

The (Human) Sampler's Curses

By Mark Thordal-Le Quement

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2016

We present a cheap talk model in which a receiver (R) sequentially consults multiple experts who are either unbiased or wish to maximize R's action, bias being unobservable. Consultation is costly and R cannot commit to future consultation behavior. We fi...

Bid Takers or Market Makers? The Effect of Auctioneers on Auction Outcome

By Nicola Lacetera, Bradley J. Larsen, Devin G. Pope, and Justin R. Sydnor

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2016

Auction design has been studied extensively; however, within a given design, does the process of how an auction is conducted matter as well? We address this question by looking for heterogeneity in the performance of auctioneers in English auctions. We an...