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  3. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
  4. November 2016
  5. The (Human) Sampler's Curses

The (Human) Sampler's Curses

  • Mark Thordal-Le Quement
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 8, no. 4, November 2016
(pp. 115-48)
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Abstract

We present a cheap talk model in which a receiver (R) sequentially consults multiple experts who are either unbiased or wish to maximize R's action, bias being unobservable. Consultation is costly and R cannot commit to future consultation behavior. We find that individual expert informativeness negatively relates to consultation extensiveness and expert trustworthiness due to biased experts' incentive to discourage further consultation by mimicking unbiased experts. We identify three (sampler's) curses: R may lose from an increase in the number or in the trustworthiness of experts as well as from a decrease in consultation costs.

Citation

Thordal-Le Quement, Mark. 2016. "The (Human) Sampler's Curses." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8 (4): 115-48. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150009

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
  • D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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