American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Timing Decisions in Organizations: Communication and Authority in a Dynamic Environment
American Economic Review
vol. 106,
no. 9, September 2016
(pp. 2552–81)
Abstract
We consider a problem where an uninformed principal makes a timing decision interacting with an informed but biased agent. Because time is irreversible, the direction of the bias crucially affects the agent's ability to credibly communicate information. When the agent favors late decision making, full information revelation often occurs. In this case, centralized decision making, where the principal retains authority and communicates with the agent, implements the optimal decision-making rule. When the agent favors early decision making, communication is partial, and the optimal decision-making rule is not implemented. Delegation adds value when the bias is for early decision making, but not for late decision making.Citation
Grenadier, Steven R., Andrey Malenko, and Nadya Malenko. 2016. "Timing Decisions in Organizations: Communication and Authority in a Dynamic Environment." American Economic Review 106 (9): 2552–81. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20150416Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D21 Firm Behavior: Theory
- D23 Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness