Wasteful Sanctions, Underperformance, and Endogenous Supervision

By David A. Miller and Kareen Rozen

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2014

We study optimal contracting in team settings where agents have many opportunities to shirk, task-level monitoring is needed to provide useful incentives, and it is difficult to write individual performance into formal contracts. Incentives are provided ...

The Day Care Assignment: A Dynamic Matching Problem

By John Kennes, Daniel Monte, and Norovsambuu Tumennasan

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2014

We study the problem of centralized allocation of children to public daycare centers, illustrated by the case of Denmark. Our framework applies to problems of dynamic matching in which there is entry and exit of agents over time; for example, the schoo...

Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification

By Elchanan Ben-Porath, Eddie Dekel, and Barton L. Lipman

American Economic Review, December 2014

A principal allocates an object to one of I agents. Each agent values receiving the object and has private information regarding the value to the principal of giving it to him. There are no monetary transfers, but the principal can check an agent's inf...

Is It Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process

By Marianne Bertrand, Matilde Bombardini, and Francesco Trebbi

American Economic Review, December 2014

Do lobbyists provide issue-specific information to members of Congress? Or do they provide special interests access to politicians? We present evidence to assess the role of issue expertise versus connections in the US Federal lobbying process and illus...

Reputation and Persistence of Adverse Selection in Secondary Loan Markets

By V. V. Chari, Ali Shourideh, and Ariel Zetlin-Jones

American Economic Review, December 2014

The volume of new issuances in secondary loan markets fluctuates over time and falls when collateral values fall. We develop a model with adverse selection and reputation that is consistent with such fluctuations. Adverse selection ensures that the vol...

Behavioral Contract Theory

By Botond Koszegi

Journal of Economic Literature, December 2014

This review provides a critical survey of psychology-and-economics ("behavioral-economics") research in contract theory. First, I introduce the theories of individual decision making most frequently used in behavioral contract theory, and formally illustr...

Expanding "Choice" in School Choice

By Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Yeon-Koo Che, and Yosuke Yasuda

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, February 2015

Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance (henceforth DA) mechanism has emerged as a prominent candidate for placing students to public schools. While DA has desirable fairness and incentive properties, it limits the applicants' abilities to communicate their pr...

Subjective Evaluations: Discretionary Bonuses and Feedback Credibility

By William Fuchs

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, February 2015

We provide a new rationale for the use of discretionary bonuses. In a setting with unknown match qualities between a worker and a firm and subjective evaluations by the principal, bonuses are useful in order to make the feedback from the firm to the worke...

Repeated Interaction and Rating Inflation: A Model of Double Reputation

By Sivan Frenkel

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, February 2015

Credit rating agencies have an incentive to maintain a public reputation for credibility among investors but also have an incentive to develop a second, private reputation for leniency among issuers. We show that in markets with few issuers, such as marke...

Robustness and Linear Contracts

By Gabriel Carroll

American Economic Review, February 2015

We consider a moral hazard problem where the principal is uncertain as to what the agent can and cannot do: she knows some actions available to the agent, but other, unknown actions may also exist. The principal demands robustness, evaluating possible ...

Price Subsidies, Diagnostic Tests, and Targeting of Malaria Treatment: Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial

By Jessica Cohen, Pascaline Dupas, and Simone Schaner

American Economic Review, February 2015

Both under- and over-treatment of communicable diseases are public bads. But efforts to decrease one run the risk of increasing the other. Using rich experimental data on household treatment- seeking behavior in Kenya, we study the implications of this...

Information Disclosure as a Matching Mechanism: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment

By Steven Tadelis and Florian Zettelmeyer

American Economic Review, February 2015

Market outcomes depend on the quality of information available to its participants. We measure the effect of information disclosure on market outcomes using a large-scale field experiment that randomly discloses quality information in wholesale automob...

Adverse Selection and an Individual Mandate: When Theory Meets Practice

By Martin B. Hackmann, Jonathan T. Kolstad, and Amanda E. Kowalski

American Economic Review, March 2015

We develop a model of selection that incorporates a key element of recent health reforms: an individual mandate. Using data from Massachusetts, we estimate the parameters of the model. In the individual market for health insurance, we find that premiums a...

The Virtues of Hesitation: Optimal Timing in a Non-stationary World

By Urmee Khan and Maxwell B. Stinchcombe

American Economic Review, March 2015

In many economic, political, and social situations, circumstances change at random points in time, reacting is costly, and reactions appropriate to present circumstances may become inappropriate upon future changes, requiring further costly reaction. Wait...

Jon Elster's Securities against Misrule: Juries, Assemblies, Elections: A Review Essay

By David Austen-Smith

Journal of Economic Literature, March 2015

The standard economic approach to designing institutions for collective decision making recognizes individuals' strategically rational motivations for misrepresentation and asks how best, given an objective function, to design a set of incentives and cons...

A Review of William Easterly's The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor

By Carol Graham

Journal of Economic Literature, March 2015

William Easterly marshals yet another brilliant critique of established development policies, with a focus on the experts' excessive focus on state-led policies and goals (a la Myrdal) and ignorance of bottom-up solutions, including technology and individ...

The Role of Connections in Academic Promotions

By Natalia Zinovyeva and Manuel Bagues

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, April 2015

This paper analyzes how evaluators' private information and subjective biases affect evaluations in academia. We use evidence from centralized selection exams in Spain, where evaluators are randomly assigned to promotion committees. Candidates are signifi...

Unemployment Insurance Fraud and Optimal Monitoring

By David L. Fuller, B. Ravikumar, and Yuzhe Zhang

American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, April 2015

An important incentive problem for the design of unemployment insurance is the fraudulent collection of unemployment benefits by workers who are gainfully employed. We show how to efficiently use a combination of tax/subsidy and monitoring to prevent such...

Formal versus Informal Monitoring in Teams

By Alex Gershkov and Eyal Winter

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, May 2015

In this paper we analyze a principal's optimal monitoring strategies in a team environment. In doing so we study the interaction between formal monitoring and informal (peer) monitoring. We show that if the technology satisfies complementarity, peer monit...

Becoming the Neighbor Bidder: Endogenous Winner's Curse in Dynamic Mechanisms

By Alejandro Francetich

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, May 2015

This paper addresses the problem of sequentially allocating time sensitive goods, or one-period leases on a durable good, among agents who compete through time and learn about the common component of their valuation privately through experience. I show th...