Strategic Private Experimentation
- (pp. 74-105)
AbstractWe consider a model of persuasion in which an agent who tries to persuade a decision maker can sequentially acquire imperfect signals. The agentâ€™s information acquisition is unobservable and he has the option to hide unfavorable signals. Nevertheless, if the signal precision is sufficiently high, he can persuade the decision maker by revealing a sufficiently large number of favorable signals. When the number of signals that can be transmitted to the decision maker is limited, persuasion is impossible if the agentâ€™s stakes are too high.
CitationFelgenhauer, Mike, and Elisabeth Schulte. 2014. "Strategic Private Experimentation." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6 (4): 74-105. DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.4.74
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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