Expanding "Choice" in School Choice
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 7,
no. 1, February 2015
(pp. 1-42)
Abstract
Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance (henceforth DA) mechanism has emerged as a prominent candidate for placing students to public schools. While DA has desirable fairness and incentive properties, it limits the applicants' abilities to communicate their preference intensities, which entails ex ante inefficiency when ties at school preferences are broken randomly. We propose a variant of deferred acceptance mechanism that allows students to influence how they are treated in ties. It inherits much of the desirable properties of DA but performs better in ex ante efficiency. (JEL D82, H75, I21, I28)Citation
Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, Yeon-Koo Che, and Yosuke Yasuda. 2015. "Expanding "Choice" in School Choice." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7 (1): 1-42. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20120027Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H75 State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
- I21 Analysis of Education
- I28 Education: Government Policy
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