The Day Care Assignment: A Dynamic Matching Problem
- (pp. 362-406)
Abstract
We study the problem of centralized allocation of children to public daycare centers, illustrated by the case of Denmark. Our framework applies to problems of dynamic matching in which there is entry and exit of agents over time; for example, the school choice problem once student mobility is taken into account. We show that there does not exist any mechanism that is both stable and strategy-proof. We also show that the well-known Top Trading Cycles mechanism is neither Pareto efficient nor strategy-proof. Finally, a mechanism in which parents sequentially choose menus of schools is both strategy-proof and Pareto efficient.Citation
Kennes, John, Daniel Monte, and Norovsambuu Tumennasan. 2014. "The Day Care Assignment: A Dynamic Matching Problem." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6 (4): 362-406. DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.4.362Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- I21 Analysis of Education
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