Regression Discontinuity in Serial Dictatorship: Achievement Effects at Chicago's Exam Schools
- (pp. 240-45)
AbstractMany school and college admission systems use centralized mechanisms to allocate seats based on applicant preferences and school priorities. When tie-breaking uses non-randomly assigned criteria like distance or a test score, applicants with the same preferences and priorities are not directly comparable. The non-lottery setting does generate a kind of local random assignment that opens the door to regression discontinuity designs. This paper introduces a hybrid RD/propensity score empirical strategy that exploits quasi-experiments embedded in serial dictatorship, a mechanism widely used for college and selective K-12 school admissions. We use our approach to estimate achievement effects of Chicago's exam schools.
Citation2017. "Regression Discontinuity in Serial Dictatorship: Achievement Effects at Chicago's Exam Schools." American Economic Review, 107 (5): 240-45. DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20171111
- C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D44 Auctions
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- I21 Analysis of Education