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  3. American Economic Review
  4. May 2017
  5. How the Second-Order Free Rider Problem Is Solved in a Small-Scale Society

How the Second-Order Free Rider Problem Is Solved in a Small-Scale Society

  • Sarah Mathew
American Economic Review
vol. 107, no. 5, May 2017
(pp. 578-81)
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Abstract

Moralistic punishment enables human cooperation, but an outstanding question is why people voluntarily sanction when they can obtain the benefits of punishment without being enforcers themselves. To address how decentralized societies solve this second-order free rider issue, I examine why people punish among the Turkana, a population in Kenya in which informal peer sanctioning sustains participation in high-stakes interethnic warfare. Using vignette experiments I show that Turkana subjects express punitive sentiments toward second-order free riders and those who sanction irresponsibly. The prevalence of such meta norms regulating punishment reveal a possible pathway by which moralistic punishment could have evolved.

Citation

Mathew, Sarah. 2017. "How the Second-Order Free Rider Problem Is Solved in a Small-Scale Society." American Economic Review, 107 (5): 578-81. DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20171090

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • J15 Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
  • K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
  • O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
  • O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
  • Z13 Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification