Stable and Strategy-Proof Matching with Flexible Allotments
AbstractWe introduce a framework of matching with flexible allotments that can be used to model firms with cross-division hiring restrictions. Our framework also allows us to nest some prior models of matching with distributional constraints. Building upon our recent work on observable substitutability, we show that multi-division choice functions with flexible allotments enable stable and strategy-proof matching; these results illustrate the value of clearly mapping when stable and strategy-proof matching is possible.
CitationHatfield, John William, Scott Duke Kominers, and Alexander Westkamp. 2017. "Stable and Strategy-Proof Matching with Flexible Allotments." American Economic Review, 107 (5): 214-19. DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20171050
- C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D21 Firm Behavior: Theory
- D86 Economics of Contract: Theory