Redesigning the Israeli Psychology Master's Match
- (pp. 205-09)
AbstractWe report on the centralization of a two-sided matching-with-contracts market, in which pre-existing choice functions violate the substitutes condition. The ability to accommodate these choice functions was critical for the success of our design. The new mechanism is stable and strategy-proof for applicants. It is well accepted by both sides of the market. Our study provides a strong empirical validation for the practical relevance of recent theoretical advances on matching without substitutes.
Citation2017. "Redesigning the Israeli Psychology Master's Match." American Economic Review, 107 (5): 205-09. DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20171048
- C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D40 Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 Economics of Contract: Theory