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  3. American Economic Review
  4. May 2017
  5. Redesigning the Israeli Psychology Master's Match

Redesigning the Israeli Psychology Master's Match

  • Avinatan Hassidim
  • Assaf Romm
  • Ran I. Shorrer
American Economic Review
vol. 107, no. 5, May 2017
(pp. 205-09)
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Abstract

We report on the centralization of a two-sided matching-with-contracts market, in which pre-existing choice functions violate the substitutes condition. The ability to accommodate these choice functions was critical for the success of our design. The new mechanism is stable and strategy-proof for applicants. It is well accepted by both sides of the market. Our study provides a strong empirical validation for the practical relevance of recent theoretical advances on matching without substitutes.

Citation

Hassidim, Avinatan, Assaf Romm, and Ran I. Shorrer. 2017. "Redesigning the Israeli Psychology Master's Match." American Economic Review, 107 (5): 205-09. DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20171048

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
  • D40 Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General
  • D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
  • D86 Economics of Contract: Theory