American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Earnings, Disposable Income, and Consumption of Allowed and Rejected Disability Insurance Applicants
American Economic Review
vol. 105,
no. 5, May 2015
(pp. 137–41)
Abstract
Two key questions in thinking about the size and growth of the disability insurance program are to what extent it discourages work, and how valuable the insurance is to individuals and families. These questions motivate our paper. We begin by describing the earnings, disposable income, and consumption of awarded and rejected DI applicants, before and after the disability onset and the allowance decision. Next, we discuss how these descriptive results can be interpreted through the lens of alternative empirical approaches. Our analysis uses a Norwegian population panel data set with detailed information about every individual and household.Citation
Kostøl, Andreas Ravndal, and Magne Mogstad. 2015. "Earnings, Disposable Income, and Consumption of Allowed and Rejected Disability Insurance Applicants." American Economic Review 105 (5): 137–41. DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20151063Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
- G22 Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- I13 Health Insurance, Public and Private
- I18 Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- J14 Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped; Non-labor Market Discrimination
- J31 Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials