Measuring Vote-Selling: Field Evidence from the Philippines
American Economic Review
vol. 105,
no. 5, May 2015
(pp. 352-56)
Abstract
Using data from an anti-vote-buying field experiment we conducted in the Philippines, we report and validate a proxy measure for vote-selling. We demonstrate that our proxy measure, vote-switching, changes as expected with voter preferences and monetary offers from candidates. Voters are less likely to vote for someone different than their initial preference the larger the favorability rating difference between the preferred and alternative candidates. Similarly, vote-switching increases the more money the alternative candidate offers compared to the preferred candidates. We also describe the effects of the promise-based interventions on vote-switching, reported in full in a companion paper.Citation
Hicken, Allen, Stephen Leider, Nico Ravanilla, and Dean Yang. 2015. "Measuring Vote-Selling: Field Evidence from the Philippines." American Economic Review, 105 (5): 352-56. DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20151033Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements