American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Standing United or Falling Divided? High Stakes Bargaining in a TV Game Show
American Economic Review
vol. 105,
no. 5, May 2015
(pp. 402–07)
Abstract
We examine high stakes three-person bargaining in a game show where contestants bargain over a large money amount that is split into three unequal shares. We find that individual behavior and outcomes are strongly influenced by equity concerns: those who contributed more to the jackpot claim larger shares, are less likely to make concessions, and take home larger amounts. Contestants who announce that they will not back down do well relative to others, but they do not secure larger absolute amounts and they harm others. There is no evidence of a first-mover advantage and little evidence that demographic characteristics matter.Citation
van Dolder, Dennie, Martijn J. van den Assem, Colin F. Camerer, and Richard H. Thaler. 2015. "Standing United or Falling Divided? High Stakes Bargaining in a TV Game Show." American Economic Review 105 (5): 402–07. DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20151017Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
- L82 Entertainment; Media