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  3. American Economic Review
  4. December 2009
  5. Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match

Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match

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Abstract

The design of the New York City (NYC) high school match involved trade-offs among efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences -- ties -- in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school -- single tiebreaking -- in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tiebreaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions. (JEL C78, D82, I21)

Citation

Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. 2009. "Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match." American Economic Review, 99 (5): 1954-78. DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.5.1954

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
  • D82 Asymmetric and Private Information
  • I21 Analysis of Education