Choice Screen Auctions
American Economic Review
vol. 113,
no. 9, September 2023
(pp. 2486-2505)
Abstract
Choice screen auctions have been recently deployed in 31 European countries, allowing consumers to choose their preferred search engine on Google's Android platform instead of being automatically defaulted to Google's own search engine. I show that a seemingly minor detail in the design of these auctions—whether they are conducted on a "per appearance" or a "per install" basis—plays a major role in the mix and characteristics of auction winners and, consequently, in their expected market share. Furthermore, per install auctions distort search engines' incentives. Empirical evidence from Android choice screen auctions conducted in 2020 is consistent with my theoretical results.Citation
Ostrovsky, Michael. 2023. "Choice Screen Auctions." American Economic Review, 113 (9): 2486-2505. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20220699Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D44 Auctions
- D47 Market Design
- K21 Antitrust Law
- L40 Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
- L86 Information and Internet Services; Computer Software