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  4. September 2021
  5. From Weber to Kafka: Political Instability and the Overproduction of Laws

From Weber to Kafka: Political Instability and the Overproduction of Laws

  • Gabriele Gratton
  • Luigi Guiso
  • Claudio Michelacci
  • Massimo Morelli
American Economic Review
vol. 111, no. 9, September 2021
(pp. 2964-3003)
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Abstract

With inefficient bureaucratic institutions, the effects of laws are hard to assess and incompetent politicians may pass laws to build a reputation as skillful reformers. Since too many laws curtail bureaucratic efficiency, this mechanism can generate a steady state with Kafkaesque bureaucracy. Temporary surges in political instability heighten the incentives to overproduce laws and can shift the economy towards the Kafkaesque state. Consistent with the theory, after a surge in political instability in the early 1990s, Italy experienced a significant increase in the amount of poor-quality legislation and a decrease in bureaucratic efficiency.

Citation

Gratton, Gabriele, Luigi Guiso, Claudio Michelacci, and Massimo Morelli. 2021. "From Weber to Kafka: Political Instability and the Overproduction of Laws." American Economic Review, 111 (9): 2964-3003. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190672

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
  • D73 Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption