American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Vulnerability and Clientelism
American Economic Review
vol. 112,
no. 11, November 2022
(pp. 3627–59)
Abstract
This study argues that economic vulnerability causes citizens to participate in clientelism, a phenomenon with various pernicious consequences. To examine how reduced vulnerability affects citizens' participation in clientelism, we employ two exogenous shocks to vulnerability. First, we designed a randomized control trial to reduce household vulnerability: our development intervention constructed residential water cisterns in drought-prone areas of Brazil. Second, we exploit rainfall shocks. We find that reducing vulnerability significantly decreases requests for private goods from politicians, especially among citizens likely to be in clientelist relationships. Moreover, reducing vulnerability decreases votes for incumbent mayors, who typically have more resources for clientelism.Citation
Bobonis, Gustavo J., Paul J. Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, and Simeon Nichter. 2022. "Vulnerability and Clientelism." American Economic Review 112 (11): 3627–59. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190565Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H41 Public Goods
- I38 Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
- O12 Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
- O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- Q54 Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming