Incentivized Resume Rating: Eliciting Employer Preferences without Deception
- (pp. 3713-44)
Abstract
We introduce a new experimental paradigm to evaluate employer preferences, called incentivized resume rating (IRR). Employers evaluate resumes they know to be hypothetical in order to be matched with real job seekers, preserving incentives while avoiding the deception necessary in audit studies. We deploy IRR with employers recruiting college seniors from a prestigious school, randomizing human capital characteristics and demographics of hypothetical candidates. We measure both employer preferences for candidates and employer beliefs about the likelihood that candidates will accept job offers, avoiding a typical confound in audit studies. We discuss the costs, benefits, and future applications of this new methodology.Citation
Kessler, Judd B., Corinne Low, and Colin D. Sullivan. 2019. "Incentivized Resume Rating: Eliciting Employer Preferences without Deception." American Economic Review, 109 (11): 3713-44. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20181714Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- I26 Returns to Education
- J23 Labor Demand
- J24 Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- M51 Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions