Losing Prosociality in the Quest for Talent? Sorting, Selection, and Productivity in the Delivery of Public Services
- (pp. 1355-94)
(Complimentary)
Abstract
We embed a field experiment in a nationwide recruitment drive for a new health care position in Zambia to test whether career benefits attract talent at the expense of prosocial motivation. In line with common wisdom, offering career opportunities attracts less prosocial applicants. However, the trade-off exists only at low levels of talent; the marginal applicants in treatment are more talented and equally prosocial. These are hired, and perform better at every step of the causal chain: they provide more inputs, increase facility utilization, and improve health outcomes including a 25 percent decrease in child malnutrition.Citation
Ashraf, Nava, Oriana Bandiera, Edward Davenport, and Scott S. Lee. 2020. "Losing Prosociality in the Quest for Talent? Sorting, Selection, and Productivity in the Delivery of Public Services." American Economic Review, 110 (5): 1355-94. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20180326Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- H83 Public Administration; Public Sector Accounting and Audits
- I11 Analysis of Health Care Markets
- I13 Health Insurance, Public and Private
- J24 Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- M51 Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
- O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
- Z13 Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification