Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment
AbstractWe introduce a model where social norms of voting participation are strategically chosen by competing political parties and determine voters' turnout. Social norms must be enforced through costly peer monitoring and punishment. When the cost of enforcement of social norms is low, the larger party is always advantaged. Otherwise, in the spirit of Olson (1965), the smaller party may be advantaged. Our model shares features of the ethical voter model and it delivers novel and empirically relevant comparative statics results.
CitationLevine, David K., and Andrea Mattozzi. 2020. "Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment." American Economic Review, 110 (10): 3298-3314. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20170476
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Z13 Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification