Corruption, Trade Costs, and Gains from Tariff Liberalization: Evidence from Southern Africa
- (pp. 3029-63)
Abstract
This paper exploits quasi-experimental variation in tariffs in southern Africa to estimate trade elasticities. Traded quantities respond only weakly to a 30 percent reduction in the average nominal tariff rate. Trade flow data combined with primary data on firm behavior and bribe payments suggest that corruption is a potential explanation for the observed low elasticities. In contexts of pervasive corruption, even small bribes can significantly reduce tariffs, making tariff liberalization schemes less likely to affect the extensive and the intensive margins of firms' import behavior. The tariff liberalization scheme is, however, still associated with improved incentives to accurately report quantities of imported goods, and with a significant reduction in bribe transfers from importers to public officials.Citation
Sequeira, Sandra. 2016. "Corruption, Trade Costs, and Gains from Tariff Liberalization: Evidence from Southern Africa." American Economic Review, 106 (10): 3029-63. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20150313Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D22 Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
- D73 Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- F13 Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- H83 Public Administration; Public Sector Accounting and Audits
- O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- O19 International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
- O24 Development Planning and Policy: Trade Policy; Factor Movement; Foreign Exchange Policy