Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction
- (pp. 2528-51)
AbstractThe combinatorial clock auction has become popular for large-scale spectrum awards and other uses, replacing more traditional ascending or clock auctions. We describe some surprising properties of the auction, including a wide range of ex post equilibria with demand expansion, demand reduction, and predation. Our results obtain in a standard homogeneous good setting where bidders have well-behaved linear demand curves, and suggest some practical difficulties with dynamic implementations of the Vickrey auction.
Citation2016. "Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction." American Economic Review, 106(9): 2528-51. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20141212
- D44 Auctions
- D47 Market Design
- H82 Governmental Property
- L13 Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets