Household Bargaining and Excess Fertility: An Experimental Study in Zambia
- (pp. 2210-37)
Abstract
We posit that household decision-making over fertility is characterized by moral hazard since most contraception can only be perfectly observed by the woman. Using an experiment in Zambia that varied whether women were given access to contraceptives alone or with their husbands, we find that women given access with their husbands were 19 percent less likely to seek family planning services, 25 percent less likely to use concealable contraception, and 27 percent more likely to give birth. However, women given access to contraception alone report a lower subjective well-being, suggesting a psycho-social cost of making contraceptives more concealable.Citation
Ashraf, Nava, Erica Field, and Jean Lee. 2014. "Household Bargaining and Excess Fertility: An Experimental Study in Zambia." American Economic Review, 104 (7): 2210-37. DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.7.2210Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- I31 General Welfare; Well-Being
- J13 Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
- J16 Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
- O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration