Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution: Comment
- (pp. 1857-63)
AbstractDemichelis & Weibull (AER 2008) show that adding lexicographic lying costs to coordination games with cheap talk yields a sharp prediction: only the efficient outcome is evolutionarily stable. I show that this result is caused by the discontinuity of preferences rather than by small lying costs per se. Finally, I discuss why discontinuity may not be an appealing assumption in evolutionary models.
Citation2014. "Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution: Comment." American Economic Review, 104(6): 1857-63. DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.6.1857
- C72 Noncooperative Games
- C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- Z13 Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification