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  3. American Economic Review
  4. June 2014
  5. Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution: Comment

Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution: Comment

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Abstract

Demichelis & Weibull (AER 2008) show that adding lexicographic lying costs to coordination games with cheap talk yields a sharp prediction: only the efficient outcome is evolutionarily stable. I show that this result is caused by the discontinuity of preferences rather than by small lying costs per se. Finally, I discuss why discontinuity may not be an appealing assumption in evolutionary models.

Citation

Heller, Yuval. 2014. "Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution: Comment." American Economic Review, 104 (6): 1857-63. DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.6.1857

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C72 Noncooperative Games
  • C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
  • Z13 Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification