Revolving Door Lobbyists
- (pp. 3731-48)
AbstractWashington's "revolving door"—the movement from government service into the lobbying industry—is regarded as a major concern for policy-making. We study how ex-government staffers benefit from the personal connections acquired during their public service. Lobbyists with experience in the office of a US Senator suffer a 24 percent drop in generated revenue when that Senator leaves office. The effect is immediate, discontinuous around the exit period, and long-lasting. Consistent with the notion that lobbyists sell access to powerful politicians, the drop in revenue is increasing in the seniority of and committee assignments power held by the exiting politician.
CitationBlanes i Vidal, Jordi, Mirko Draca, and Christian Fons-Rosen. 2012. "Revolving Door Lobbyists." American Economic Review, 102 (7): 3731-48. DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.7.3731
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- J44 Professional Labor Markets; Occupational Licensing
- L84 Personal, Professional, and Business Services