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  3. American Economic Review
  4. February 2012
  5. Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act

Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act

  • Petra Moser
  • Alessandra Voena
American Economic Review
vol. 102, no. 1, February 2012
(pp. 396-427)
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Abstract

Compulsory licensing allows firms in developing countries to produce foreign-owned inventions without the consent of foreign patent owners. This paper uses an exogenous event of compulsory licensing after World War I under the Trading with the Enemy Act to examine the effects of compulsory licensing on domestic invention. Difference-in-differences analyses of nearly 130,000 chemical inventions suggest that compulsory licensing increased domestic invention by 20 percent. (JEL D45, L24, N42, O31, O34)

Citation

Moser, Petra, and Alessandra Voena. 2012. "Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act." American Economic Review, 102 (1): 396-427. DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.1.396

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D45 Rationing; Licensing
  • L24 Contracting Out; Joint Ventures; Technology Licensing
  • N42 Economic History: Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation: U.S.; Canada: 1913-
  • O31 Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
  • O34 Intellectual Property Rights