Strike Three: Discrimination, Incentives, and Evaluation
- (pp. 1410-35)
Abstract
Major League Baseball umpires express their racial/ethnic preferences when they evaluate pitchers. Strikes are called less often if the umpire and pitcher do not match race/ethnicity, but mainly where there is little scrutiny of umpires. Pitchers understand the incentives and throw pitches that allow umpires less subjective judgment (e.g., fastballs over home plate) when they anticipate bias. These direct and indirect effects bias performance measures of minorities downward. The results suggest how discrimination alters discriminated groups' behavior generally. They imply that biases in measured productivity must be accounted for in generating measures of wage discrimination. (JEL J15, J31, J44, J71, L83)Citation
Parsons, Christopher A., Johan Sulaeman, Michael C. Yates, and Daniel S. Hamermesh. 2011. "Strike Three: Discrimination, Incentives, and Evaluation." American Economic Review, 101 (4): 1410-35. DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.4.1410Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- J15 Economics of Minorities and Races; Non-labor Discrimination
- J31 Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- J44 Professional Labor Markets; Occupational Licensing
- J71 Labor Discrimination
- L83 Sports; Gambling; Recreation; Tourism