Participation
American Economic Review
vol. 101,
no. 4, June 2011
(pp. 1211-37)
Abstract
We show experimentally that whether and how communication achieves beneficial social outcomes in a hidden-information context depends crucially on whether low-talent agents can participate in a Pareto-improving outcome. Communication is effective (and patterns of lies and truth quite systematic) when this is feasible, but otherwise completely ineffective. We examine the data in light of two potentially relevant behavioral models: cost-of-lying and guilt-fromblame. (JEL D82, D83, Z13)Citation
Charness, Gary, and Martin Dufwenberg. 2011. "Participation." American Economic Review, 101 (4): 1211-37. DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.4.1211Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
- Z13 Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification