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  4. December 2010
  5. Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts

Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts

  • Antonio Cabrales
  • Raffaele Miniaci
  • Marco Piovesan
  • Giovanni Ponti
American Economic Review
vol. 100, no. 5, December 2010
(pp. 2261-78)
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Abstract

This paper reports a three-phase experiment on a stylized labor market. In the first two phases, agents face simple games, which we use to estimate subjects' social and reciprocity concerns. In the last phase, four principals compete by offering agents a contract from a fixed menu. Then, agents "choose to work" for a principal by selecting one of the available contracts. We find that (i) (heterogeneous) social preferences are significant determinants of choices, (ii) for both principals and agents, strategic uncertainty aversion is a stronger determinant of choices than fairness, and (iii) agents display a marked propensity to work for principals with similar distributional concerns. (JEL D82, D86, J41)

Citation

Cabrales, Antonio, Raffaele Miniaci, Marco Piovesan, and Giovanni Ponti. 2010. "Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts." American Economic Review, 100 (5): 2261-78. DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.5.2261

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D82 Asymmetric and Private Information
  • D86 Economics of Contract: Theory
  • J41 Labor Contracts