Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments
American Economic Review
vol. 100,
no. 1, March 2010
(pp. 541-56)
Abstract
One lingering puzzle is why voluntary contributions to public goods decline over time in experimental and real-world settings. We show that the decline of cooperation is driven by individual preferences for imperfect conditional cooperation. Many people's desire to contribute less than others, rather than changing beliefs of what others will contribute over time or people's heterogeneity in preferences makes voluntary cooperation fragile. Universal free riding thus eventually emerges, despite the fact that most people are not selfish. (D12, D 83, H41, Z13)Citation
Fischbacher, Urs, and Simon Gächter. 2010. "Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments." American Economic Review, 100 (1): 541-56. DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.1.541Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
- H41 Public Goods
- Z13 Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification