Intergroup Conflict and Intra-group Punishment in an Experimental Contest Game
American Economic Review
vol. 100,
no. 1, March 2010
(pp. 420-47)
Abstract
We study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our motivation stems from the analysis of sociopolitical conflict. The theoretical prediction is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and of whether punishment is available. We find, first, that conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are above equilibrium. Second, allowing group members to punish each other leads to even larger conflict expenditures. These results contrast with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency. (JEL C72, D74, H41)Citation
Abbink, Klaus, Jordi Brandts, Benedikt Herrmann, and Henrik Orzen. 2010. "Intergroup Conflict and Intra-group Punishment in an Experimental Contest Game." American Economic Review, 100 (1): 420-47. DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.1.420Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C72 Noncooperative Games
- D74 Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- H41 Public Goods