Politically Connected Firms
AbstractExamination of firms in 47 countries shows a widespread overlap of controlling shareholders and top officers who are connected with national parliaments or governments, particularly in countries with higher levels of corruption, with barriers to foreign investment, and with more transparent systems. Connections are diminished when regulations set more limits on official behavior. Additionally, I show that the announcement of a new political connection results in a significant increase in value.
CitationFaccio, Mara. 2006. "Politically Connected Firms." American Economic Review, 96 (1): 369-386. DOI: 10.1257/000282806776157704
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- L25 Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
- O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements