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  5. Truth Elicitation in a Nonstrategic Environment

American Economic Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

Truth Elicitation in a Nonstrategic Environment

  • Jacob Glazer
  • Ariel Rubinstein
American Economic Review (Forthcoming)

Abstract

A principal decides which party deserves a prize. Only the parties observe the state that determines who is deserving. The principal gives each party a text describing the conditions under which that party deserves the prize, and asks each to report the state. The parties are nonstrategic. Each activates a known cheating procedure whose outcome depends on the state and on the text. Implementation is achieved if, whenever the parties disagree, the liar is identified by the “one-way cheating principle”: The truthful party is the unique party who could not have produced his story had the rival’s story been true.

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