American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Designing Dynamic Reassignment Mechanisms: Evidence from GP Allocation
American Economic Review
(pp. 3036–75)
Abstract
We study the problem of designing a dynamic reassignment mechanism when agents' preferences over objects change over time. In the context of Norway's system for (re)assigning patients to general practitioners (GPs), we provide direct evidence of misallocation under the current mechanism—patients waiting for each others' GPs, but who cannot trade—and estimate a structural model of GP-switching behavior to evaluate alternatives. Introducing top trading cycles (TTC) would, on average, reduce waiting times and increase patient welfare. However, patients endowed with less desirable GPs would be harmed. Prioritizing these patients can avoid these harms while preserving most of the gains from TTC.Citation
Huitfeldt, Ingrid, Victoria Marone, and Daniel Waldinger. 2026. "Designing Dynamic Reassignment Mechanisms: Evidence from GP Allocation." American Economic Review 116 (8): 3036–75. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20240617Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H51 National Government Expenditures and Health
- I11 Analysis of Health Care Markets
- I13 Health Insurance, Public and Private
- I18 Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health