American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Professional Motivations in the Public Sector: Evidence from Police Officers
American Economic Review
(pp. 2962–95)
Abstract
We study how public sector workers balance their professional motivations with private economic concerns, focusing on police arrests. Arrests made near the end of an officer's shift typically require overtime work, and officers respond by reducing arrest frequency but increasing arrest quality. Days in which an officer works a second job after their police shift have higher opportunity cost, also reducing late-shift arrests. Combining our estimates in a dynamic model identifies officer preferences over workplace activity and overtime work. Our results indicate that officers' private costs of arrests have a first-order impact on the quantity and quality of enforcement.Citation
Chalfin, Aaron, and Felipe Gonçalves. 2026. "Professional Motivations in the Public Sector: Evidence from Police Officers." American Economic Review 116 (8): 2962–95. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20231696Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- J33 Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- J45 Public Sector Labor Markets