American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Talent Hoarding in Organizations
American Economic Review
(pp. 3110–51)
Abstract
Most organizations rely on managers to identify talented workers. However, managers who are evaluated on team performance have an incentive to hoard workers. This study provides the first empirical evidence of talent hoarding using personnel records and survey evidence from a large firm. Talent hoarding is self-reported by three-fourths of managers, is detectable in manager ratings of worker talent, and occurs more frequently under stronger hoarding incentives, proxied by performance-related pay, team size, and talent visibility. Using quasi-random exposure to talent hoarding, I show that hoarding deters internal job applications, inhibiting career progression and altering talent allocation in the firm.Citation
Haegele, Ingrid. 2026. "Talent Hoarding in Organizations." American Economic Review 116 (8): 3110–51. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20220264Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D22 Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
- J23 Labor Demand
- L60 Industry Studies: Manufacturing: General
- M12 Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
- M51 Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
- M54 Personnel Economics: Labor Management