Search

Showing 12,221-12,240 of 13,860 items.

Polarization and Ambiguity

By Sandeep Baliga, Eran Hanany, and Peter Klibanoff

American Economic Review, December 2013

We offer a theory of polarization as an optimal response to ambiguity. Suppose individual A's beliefs first-order stochastically dominate individual B's. They observe a common signal. They exhibit polarization if A's posterior dominates her prior and B'...

The New Economics of Equilibrium Sorting and Policy Evaluation Using Housing Markets

By Nicolai V. Kuminoff, V. Kerry Smith, and Christopher Timmins

Journal of Economic Literature, December 2013

Households "sort" across neighborhoods according to their wealth and their preferences for public goods, social characteristics, and commuting opportunities. The aggregation of these individual choices in markets and in other institutions influences th...

Exchange Rate Predictability

By Barbara Rossi

Journal of Economic Literature, December 2013

The main goal of this article is to provide an answer to the question: does anything forecast exchange rates, and if so, which variables? It is well known that exchange rate fluctuations are very difficult to predict using economic models, and that a r...

Sales Taxes and Internet Commerce

By Liran Einav, Dan Knoepfle, Jonathan Levin, and Neel Sundaresan

American Economic Review, January 2014

We estimate the sensitivity of Internet retail purchasing to sales taxes using eBay data. Our first approach exploits the fact that a seller's location—and therefore the applicable tax rate—is revealed only after a buyer has expressed interest in a...

Risk Shocks

By Lawrence J. Christiano, Roberto Motto, and Massimo Rostagno

American Economic Review, January 2014

We augment a standard monetary dynamic general equilibrium model to include a Bernanke-Gertler-Gilchrist financial accelerator mechanism. We fit the model to US data, allowing the volatility of cross-sectional idiosyncratic uncertainty to fluctuate ove...

Aligned Delegation

By Alexander Frankel

American Economic Review, January 2014

A principal delegates multiple decisions to an agent, who has private information relevant to each decision. The principal is uncertain about the agent's preferences. I solve for max-min optimal mechanisms— those which maximize the principal's payoff...